Given the possible collapse of the agreement, Chergui summoned the parties to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa from March 18 to 20. The result, unveiled by a series of presidential decrees on March 22 and 24, was a complete turning point. Armed groups have been allocated twelve ministerial posts in a new cabinet of 39 ministers, twelve other ministerial posts at the ministerial level or other high-level posts in the offices of the President and the Prime Minister, including one to oversee the joint security units, as well as two posts of prefect and five posts of sub-prefect, all attributed to armed groups active in the areas concerned. AU officials present the compromise as a reflection of the balance of power on the ground and the need to keep the leaders of the armed groups on board, in the hope of eventually reducing the level of violence, while the AU Peace and Security Council stressed that the outcome of the Addis Ababa negotiations was in line with the provisions of the dispute settlement agreement. [fn] Interviews with Crisis Group, AU officials, April and May 2019. See also « Press Release: 834th Meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council, » Addis Ababa, March 21, 2019.Hide footnote The Central African Republic`s international partners hailed the new agreements as « strengthening an inclusive government. » [fn] See « Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Stakeholder Consultation Meeting of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic », MINUSCA, 20. March 2019.Hide footnote Finally, the agreement creates special mixed security units, probably its most important innovation. These should have been established within an excessively tight period of 60 days after signature and should initially last two years. Nevertheless, the EU, the UN and the AU are still working on their establishment and funding; In early June, the main stumbling block was that some armed groups had not provided their lists of fighters to join the groups or had produced incomplete or inflated groups.

[fn] Crisis Group Interview, Diplomat, Bangui, May 2019.Hide footnote Units must include both members of armed groups and the national armed forces under their command. Participants of armed groups will be selected and will receive short-term training. UN officials hope the joint security units can help launch the UN-backed National Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) Programme, which was officially launched in December 2018 and was expected to train several hundred members of armed groups for the army, while others are returning to civilian life. [fn] The current DDRR program is the latest iteration in a long series of demilitarization programs that date back almost continuously to the early 2000s. Although the agreement does not formally bind the joint security units to DDRR, this was the intention of the UN mission, which will lead international disarmament efforts and support the units under the agreement. Interviews with crisis groups, UN staff, Bangui, February and March 2019. The president has pledged to take 10 percent of the armed groups` new army recruits, but this commitment remains hypothetical as long as the armed groups resist demobilization. In any case, the integration of former members of armed groups into the army remains problematic, due to the level of education required and the demands of armed groups to join the army in their current self-proclaimed « ranks ».

Interview with Crisis Group, international head working on the GDR, Bangui, March 2019.Hide the footnote The expansion of the government presence – which is virtually non-existent in some rural areas – would be another peace dividend to build confidence in the agreement. The government, with the support of MINUSCA and the United Nations Development Programme, is trying to deploy additional officials throughout the country. The delivery of government services, particularly in remote areas of the North and East, would be an important signal of the Government`s commitment to addressing long-standing regional disparities. The agreement contains general statements of principle that are broadly similar to those of previous peace agreements. It focuses on the suffering caused by war; the need to address the political and social marginalization not only of women, youth and under-represented minorities, but also of entire regions; the rejection of the political manipulation of ethnicity and religion and the use of armed force for political purposes by parties; and their respect for the constitution and territorial unity of the country. Armed groups are pledging to dissolve, although the agreement contains few details about what that would actually mean. It also includes reforms that strengthen decentralization and grant former presidents special status, a concession to armed groups that still support Bozizé and Djotodia. It calls for the reactivation of bilateral pastoral commissions between the Central African Republic and its neighbours (« States of the region »), which have remained largely dormant in recent years. [fn] General information on the establishment and early functioning of these commissions can be found in the Crisis Group`s report, Avoiding the Worst in the Central African Republic, op. cit.

Cit. The relevant parts of the agreement can be found in Annex E.Hide footnote In addition, the peace agreement itself was officially signed in Bangui, the capital. This was an important change; Previous agreements were negotiated between elites and signed outside the Central African Republic. These symbolic efforts to respond to the population are now combined with additional follow-up by international stakeholders who seek to hold all parties accountable for compliance with the agreement. The AU Commission could play an important role as the architect of the agreement and a member of the National Executive Monitoring Committee. So far, it has strengthened its presence in Bangui to support the implementation of the agreement. But the view of the Central African Republic government and many Bangui residents that the AU has been too lenient towards armed groups – particularly during negotiations in Addis Ababa at the end of March – could hamper its future engagement. By working with the government to set and set standards for compliance with the agreement and to discuss it with armed groups, the AU could both improve its relations with Bangui and use its contacts with armed groups to send a clear signal of the need for progress.

The AU should also improve communication between its offices in Bangui and Addis Ababa to strengthen coordination and ensure that officials in Addis Ababa are better informed about what is happening in the country and that officials on the ground receive full support. The Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, congratulated the central African Republic`s stakeholders on the agreement. He also commended the Sudanese authorities for their role in the peace agreement, as well as the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smaïl Chergui, and his team for their diligence in accompanying the process. August 2018 After significantly intensifying its involvement in the Central African Republic, Moscow signs a military cooperation agreement with Bangui. The negotiations on this agreement were based on the experience of previous failures. This time, the mediation team, led by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), spent a year consulting with armed groups, civil society and the Government of the Central African Republic in order to reach a common understanding of the problems and grievances and to define the conditions for dialogue. The AU and ECCAS are co-guarantors of the agreement. With financial support from the EU, the African Union will also send civilian and military observers to monitor the IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU.

The treaty was negotiated in Khartoum and was held on 6 June. The agreement signed in Bangui in February is at least the sixth agreement with fourteen armed groups since some of them captured the Central African capital in 2013, triggering a crisis that continues to this day. Brokered by the AU with the participation of the Central African Republic`s neighbors, it followed the fruitful efforts of the regional body`s top diplomats to put a parallel Russian and Sudanese initiative under the auspices of the AU, which threatened to disrupt international mediation efforts in mid-2018. Like previous agreements, the agreement defines the main causes of the conflict and calls on the parties to the peaceful settlement of disputes and armed groups to disarm. It also contains two other important provisions. First, it creates special mixed security units that merge some combatants from armed groups with military formations. Second, the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, pledged to an « inclusive government » understood by AU mediators and armed groups themselves to give greater representation to these groups. The EU-backed government`s efforts to « popularize » the deal, which include translation into the sango national language, could help engage sections of a skeptical public. But to the extent that their skepticism focuses more on appointments at the end of March than on the terms of the agreement itself, officials need to explain the government`s broader approach to negotiations with armed groups, including their involvement in the government. The government`s recent communications strategy at least shows that it recognizes the challenge. [fn] The communication strategy, which differs from efforts to « popularize » the agreement, was only recently completed. Crisis Group received a project.

The government spokesman addressed the challenges of popularizing the agreement at a press conference on April 25, 2019. UN officials also explained the importance of the agreement for Central Africans living in the provinces. Hide the footnote But if it does not articulate its policies more clearly, it will be difficult to win popular support for the process, especially since this agreement is at least the sixth of its kind signed by armed groups since 2013. To receive such support, one also needs to engage more closely with the provinces, with ministers spending more time listening to the concerns of people there and fewer trips abroad. .